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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
of other railroads, even those which are, in theory at least, valid, postpone
or prevent mergers which would otherwise serve the interest of the public.
Finally, the Court seems indisposed to allow protracted litigation by
community and private interests which it feels were duly heard by the
Commission.
Two notable points apparently are still undecided. Given that the Com-
mission finds inclusion of certain roads to be necessary to the public in-
terest, is this condition satisfied by providing an opportunity for inclu-
sion even though the roads involved may reject it? Also, may parties be
precluded from litigating in multiple courts when a given court has al-
lowed them to litigate therein? 8 ' The answers to these questions will no
doubt be forthcoming in the not too distant future.
S Supra note 8.
Gilbert Schroeder
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866-
NEW STRENGTH FOR AN OLD LAW
In the summer of 1965, in response to an advertisement in the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Joseph Lee Jones, a Negro, and his wife, Barbara, visited
the Paddock Woods community of St. Louis County, Missouri for the purpose
of selecting a house and lot suitable to their needs. After investigating the
available homes, the Jones' offered to purchase a particular house and lot.
Defendants, through their agents, informed plaintiffs of their general policy
against selling houses and lots to Negroes, and in effect refused to consider
plaintiff's application to purchase a house. Plaintiffs then sought injunctive
and other relief' in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
alleging that the Alfred H. Mayer Co. 2 violated an act of Congress enacted
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now 42 U.S.C. section 1982,3 by its refusal
to sell them a home in the Paddock Woods community solely on account
of their color.4 Both the district and appellate courts ruled that section 1982
1 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (4) (1962) gives the district court the power to award "damages
or . . . equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection
of civil rights . .. .
2 Alfred Realty Company, Paddock Country Club, and Alfred H. Mayer were also
respondents.
8 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964): "All citizens shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property." See, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1964);
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
4The petitioners also argued that there was sufficient entanglement of the Missouri
government in the licensing and use of state-controlled services for the subdivision to
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was not applicable in the situation presented; but on further appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, and held "that Section
1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or
rental of property, and that the statute thus construed is a valid exercise
of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment," and was
therefore available to the plaintiffs. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
The significance of this decision is that it represents the first time in which
the precise issue of whether section 1982 applies to private action has been
squarely faced by the Supreme Court of the United States.5 In an age of
racial turmoil, this is an issue of great import, for the finding that there is
presently effective civil rights legislation applying to private action does
much to advance our nation toward the goal of eradicating segregation.
The most remarkable facet of this decision is that section 1982 has been
the law in this country in one form or another for over 100 years. Originally,
it was codified in the 1866 Civil Rights Act which provided:
[T]hat all persons born in the United States . .. are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery ... shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property .... e
The enforcement of this provision was to be accomplished by section 2 of
the Act, which made it a misdemeanor for any person acting under color
of law to deprive any inhabitant of the United States of any right secured
by the Act, and by other sections which set up the machinery for enforce-
ment.7
Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, relies heavily on the intent
that Congress evinced when debating the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to sup-
port his position that section 1982 on its face applies to private as well as
public discrimination. He notes that, "even the respondents seem to concede
that, if section 1982 'means what it says'-to use the words of the re-
spondent's brief-then it must encompass every racially motivated refusal
involve state action, and thus invoke the protections granted by the fourteenth amend-
ment. However, the Court did not find it necessary to rule upon this contention.
5 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 419-420 (1968).
6 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
7 14 Stat. 27 (1866). Because it was feared that the 1866 law was unconstitutional
in its declaration that Negroes were citizens, President Johnson vetoed the Act, resulting
in one of the few instances where a presidential veto has been overridden. However,
since the fear remained, the bill was re-enacted following passage of the fourteenth
amendment. Ultimately, through the various restructurings of the United States Code,
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was preserved in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 (1964).
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to sell or rent and cannot be confined to officially sanctioned segregation in
housing."8 This analysis is disputed by Justice Harlan's dissent, which,
using the same sources of authority, arrives at a diametrically opposed con-
clusion.9 It is Justice Stewart's contention that Congress intended to create
such a far-reaching law which forms the basis of the Court's decision. As
a result of the importance attached to the intent of Congress, this case
note will independently analyze the congressional debates in order to shed
greater light on their shadowed history. To augment this examination, this
note will also briefly survey previous judicial interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.
Any inquiry into the intent of Congress in enacting the 1866 law must
begin with its sponsor and chief advocate, Senator Lyman Trumbull of
Illinois, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. Both Justice Stewart and
Justice Harlan extensively quote Senator Trumbull in attempting to prove
their respective viewpoints. Justice Stewart quotes Senator Trumbull's obser-
vation that the thirteenth amendment "declared that all persons in the United
States should be free. This measure is intended to give effect to that declara-
tion and to secure to all persons within the United States practical freedom."'1
The generality of that statement mitigates its potency as support of Justice
Stewart's decision. An utterance of Senator Trumbull at an earlier session,
which the Court did not refer to, is far worthier of attention:
I move that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of Senate Bill No. 61,
to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the
means of their vindication . . . . It declares that there shall be no discrimination
in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of
the United States on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery."
Unfortunately, though, other, more specific statements of Trumbull's intent
do not corroborate the viewpoint that the Civil Rights Act was intended to
cover private acts of discrimination as well as governmental acts. During
the same day he uttered the phrases quoted above, Senator Trumbull em-
phasized that the need for his bill was generated by the fact that the re-
constructed state legislatures of the rebellious states were attempting once
more to affix a "badge of servitude" upon the Negroes by new statutory
enactments.' 2 Senator Trumbull's query, "[a]nd of what avail will it now be
that the Constitution of the United States has declared that slavery shall
not exist, if in the late slaveholding States laws are to be enacted and
SSupra note 5, at 421-422.
9 Supra note 5, at 452-454.
10 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
11 Id. at 211.
12 Id.
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enforced depriving persons of African descent of privileges which are
essential to freemen?"'" is indicative of his belief that such governmental
action was the obstacle to the attainment of true freedom. Another clear
expression that he intended the bill to deal solely with these government
motivated discriminations is found in the following statement:
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled in the in-
surrectionary States have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in nearly all
the States they have discriminated against them. They deny them certain rights,
subject them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them the very restrictions
which were imposed upon them in consequence of slavery . . . .The purpose of
the bill is to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry into effect the con-
stitutional amendment. The first section of the bill ...is the basis of the whole
bill. The other provisions of the bill contain the necessary machinery to give
effect to what are declared the rights of all persons in the first section .... 14
In this quote there is a specific reference to the bill's intended purpose of
destroying all discriminations imposed by the reconstructed legislatures.
Moreover, the fact that Trumbull considers the other provisions of the bill,
which undeniably relate solely to state action, to provide for the implementa-
tion of section 1, infers that section 1 is also to relate solely to state action.
Explicit delimitations of the scope of this bill are found in assertions by
the sponsor at a later session of the Senate that, "[t]he bill draws to the
Federal Government no power whatever if the States will perform their
constitutional obligations,"'r, and "it is the duty of the States to wipe out
all those laws which discriminate against persons who have been slaves, yet
if they will not do it .. . is it not incumbent upon us to carry out the
provisions of the Constitution? That is all we propose to do." 16
Trumbull did use language from which it could be implied that the bill
would "break down all discrimination between black men and white men' 17
and had "the intention to punish every body who violates the law,"'Is and it
is this verbiage which the majority seizes upon for support. 19 But it is
evident that the Senator only proposed the much narrower goal of eliminating
state-sponsored discrimination which maintains the "badge of servitude"20
and state laws which "although they do not make a man an absolute slave,
's Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 600, 476, 1758.
1' Id. at 605.
17 Id. at 599.
'8 Id. at 500.
19 Supra note 5, at 431-432.
20 Supra note 10.
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yet deprive him of the rights of a freeman." 21 This limited interpretation
seems more in line with the constitutional justification for the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, the thirteenth amendment, 22 which was not enacted to eliminate
individual action inspired by prejudice, but to set men free who had been
enslaved. The freedom which had been deprived them was the result of
private action only insofar as it conformed to the dictates of the state legis-
lation, otherwise a Negro would obviously have the right to leave his
"master" at any time without being subject to return.
There is a dearth of authority as to whether the other senators contemplated
that the Act should apply to private as well as governmental action. In a
flurry of political dramatics, the debate instead raged as to whether the Act
was constitutional23 and as to the drastic affect its enforcement would have
on states' rights.24 The failure to discuss the effect that this bill would have
if it encompassed private acts of discrimination, and the violent denunciation
of the Act's effect on state legislatures and state judiciaries, lend credence
to the argument that no one even anticipated an interpretation as broad as
that in Jones.
The little positive light shed on the question of intent is found in the
statements of the bill's supporters and opponents who, in trying to put the
bill in proper perspective, stated what they considered to be the objective
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Senator Cowan of Pennsylvania, an oppo-
nent, averred:
This is a bill for the abolition of all laws in the States which create distinctions
between black men and white ones. . . . This is a proposition to repeal by act of
Congress all State laws, all State legislation, which in any way creates distinctions
between black men and white men in so far as their civil rights and immunities
extend.25
In the same vein was the statement of a supporter, Senator Lane of Indiana:
What are the objects sought to be accomplished by this bill? That these freed
men shall be secured in the possession of all the rights, privileges, and immuni-
ties of free men; in other words, that we shall give effect to the proclamation
of emancipation and to the constitutional amendment. How else, I ask you, can
we give them effect than by doing away with the slave codes of the respective
21 Supra note 10.
22The thirteenth amendment provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CoNsT.,
amend. XIII.
23 Supra note 7, text.
24 See, e.g., Sen. Davis' speech and Sen. Cowan's speech at Coro. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 598, and 603 respectively.
2 5 Supra note 10, at 603.
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States where slavery was lately tolerated? ...Why then the necessity of passing
the law? Simply because we fear the execution of these laws if left to the State
courts. That is the necessity for this provision.26
Thus, when motivations for this bill were expressed, state action was
pinpointed as the evil which the Act was to eliminate. The remainder of Sena-
tor Wilson of Massachusetts, "that at least six of the reorganized States in
their new legislatures have passed laws wholly incompatible with the freedom
of these freedmen,1 27 was repeated by Senator Trumbull 28 to give emphasis
to the fact that it was the duty of Congress to eliminate state-imposed
discrimination-discrimination which prevented the thirteenth amendment
from attaining any efficacy.
An even clearer manifestation of intent to limit the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 to governmental action was revealed by the statements of the bill's
sponsor in the House of Representatives, Congressman Wilson of Iowa, when
he introduced the rationale of the Civil Rights Act with the assertion that,
"the entire structure of this bill rests on the discrimination relative to
civil rights and immunities made by the States on 'account of race, color
or previous condition of slavery.' "29 Wilson stated that the bill would not
be effective without the sanctions imposed by section 2, which leads to the
conclusion that the power of the states to reduce the freedmen to their former
status was all that the Congressman anticipated preventing."0 This was
not so with all of his colleagues. Congressmen Loan, Thayer, and Eldridge all
expressed the idea that this bill either should or did deal with the acts of
private individuals who deprived the Negroes of their freedom in any manner.
Representative Loan of Missouri evinced a desire to see private persons af-
fected by the Act in this query to Representative Wilson: "[W]hy [did] the
committee limit the provisions of the second section to those who act under
color of law[?] Why not let them apply to the whole community where the
acts are committed? "31 Representative Thayer of Pennsylvania, whom both
the majority and minority opinions quote as a supporter of their respective
interpretations, made reference to the fact that state legislatures had passed
laws "which reduce this class of people to the condition of bondmen." 32 But he
2 6 Supra note 10, at 602-603.
2 T Supra note 10, at 603.
28 Supra note 10, at 605.
29 Supra note 10, at 1118, 1119.
30 Supra note 10, at 1118, "I would merely enforce justice for all men .... In order
to accomplish this end it is necessary to fortify the declaratory portion of this bill
with such sanctions as will render it effective. The first of these is found in the second
section .... "
3lSupra note 10, at 1120.
82 Supra note 10, at 1151.
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then proceeded to state that, "[t]he Amendment to the Constitution gave lib-
erty to all; and in giving liberty it gave also a complete exemption from the
tyrannical acts, the tyrannical restrictions, and the tyrannical laws which
belong to the condition of slavery, and which it is the object of this bill
forever to remove." 33 Thus, to Thayer, the object was to eliminate all dis-
crimination, not only that which stemmed from laws. A greater reliance was
placed by the majority opinion on the remarks of Representative Eldridge
of Wisconsin, an opponent of the bill, whom Justice Stewart quotes with
approval:
Gentlemen refer us to individual cases of wrong perpetrated upon the freedmen
of the South as an argument why we should extend the Federal authority into
the different States to control the action of the citizens thereof . . . . I deprecate
all these measures because of the implication they carry upon their face that
the people who have heretofore owned slaves intend to do them wrong. 34
Most congressmen, however, indicated an intent similar to that of Repre-
sentative Wilson,35 viewing the state as the menace to freedom, as evi-
denced by the legislation passed in the South which was "calculated and
intended to reduce them [the Negroes] to slavery again." 86
Both this paper's examination of the Congressional Globe, and the exam-
ination of Justice Harlan's dissent, lead to the conclusion that the popular
conception of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, by the men who effected it,
was that of a bill ordained to prevent the systematic regeneracy of human
bondage by state legislatures unwilling to accept the dictates of the thirteenth
amendment. However, the broad language of many, and the specific inten-
tion of some who did indicate a desire that the Civil Rights Act not be limited
in its application to governmental action, opened the path for the Supreme
Court to find that the Civil Rights Law did not prohibit private acts of dis-
crimination.
The first cases involving the Act were not directed at the question of
whether private action was encompassed therein, but involved constitution-
ality 7 and states' rights.8 More recently, the scope of sections 1981-1983
88 Supra note 10, at 1152.
8 4 Supra note 10, at 1156.
85 Supra note 10, at 1266, Representative Raymond: "The bill proposes . . . to provide
for that class of persons thus made citizens against anticipated inequality of legislation
in the several States." Representative Bingham: "[W]hat is proposed by the provisions
of the first section? Simply to strike down by Congressional enactment every State
constitution which makes a discrimination on account of race or color in any of the
civil rights of citizens." Supra note 10, at 1291.
30 Supra note 10, at 1124.
37 In re Turner, 24 Fed. Cases 337 (No. 14, 247) (C.C. Ind. 1867); Smith v. Moody,
26 Ind. 299 (1866).
88 Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. 5, 92 Am. Dec. 468 (1867).
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has been given interpretation by two lower federal courts in cases involving
discrimination in housing projects. The courts, in both instances, ruled that
these sections were, without question, exclusively to redress wrongs per-
formed under color of law. 9
There is precedent to support the conclusions reached in Jones. In United
States v. Morris,40 concerning a conspiracy by private persons to prevent cer-
tain Negroes from leasing land solely on account of their color, the court ruled
that the acts were violative of section 1982, for:
Congress has the power, under the provisions of the thirteenth amendment, to
protect citizens of the United States in their enjoyment of those rights which
are fundamental and belong to every citizen, if the deprivation of these privileges
is solely on account of his race or color, as a denial of such privileges is an
element of servitude within the meaning of that amendment. 4'
The lower court in Jones42 also foresaw the possibility of a more liberal
interpretation when it stated:
It would not be too surprising if the Supreme Court one day were to hold that
a court errs when it dismisses a complaint of this kind: It could do so by assert-
ing that section 1982 was, because of its derivation from the thirteenth amend-
ment, free of the shackles of state action. .... 43
Although Jones v. Mayer is the first case before the Supreme Court which
has presented the precise issue of whether section 1982 deals with private
action, this is not the first time in which they have discussed the matter.
The first instance of its appearance before the Supreme Court was in Vir-
ginia v. Rives.44 In its opinion, the Court remarked that the 1870 re-enact-
ment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 meant that the constitutionality of
the Act rested upon the fourteenth amendment, which referred only to state
action. Justice Field, in his concurring opinion, observed that:
The Civil Rights Act ... was only intended to secure to the colored race the same
rights and privileges as are enjoyed by white persons: it was not designed to relieve
them from those obstacles in the enjoyment of their rights to which all other
persons are subjects, and which grow out of popular prejudices and passions.45
Another, and far more important case, which pronounced dicta of a nature
89 Johnson v. Levitt and Sons, 131 F. Supp. 114 (ED. Pa. 1955); Waters v. Paschen
Contractors, 227 F. Supp. 659 (NJ). Ill. 1964).
40 United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
4 1 Id. at 44.
42 Jones v. Mayer, 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
43 Id. at 44.
44 Virginia v. Rives, 100 US. 313 (1879).
45 Id. at 333.
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similar to that of Virginia v. Rives, was the Civil Rights Cases.46 In words
reminiscent of Justice Field, Justice Bradley also stated that civil rights
can only be granted or denied by government:
[I]t is proper to state that civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution
against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals,
unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or execu-
tive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual unsupported by any such
authority is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual .. . .An indi-
vidual cannot deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold property, to buy and
sell, to sue in the courts, . . . he may, by force or fraud, interfere with the
enjoyment of the right in a particular case . . . but, unless protected in these
wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he cannot destroy
or injure the right .... 47
The most recent opportunity for the Court to rule upon the scope of
section 1982 was in Hurd v. Hodge,48 which involved an attempt by private
individuals to enforce racially restrictive covenants by means of a federal
district court injunction. The opinion in Hurd stated that section 1982 was
directed only toward governmental action. 49 Justice Stewart, in an ironic
twist, employed that case as support for his position, asserting that, "Hurd
v. Hodge, ...squarely, held ... that a Negro citizen who is denied the
opportunity to purchase the home he wants '[s]olely because of [his] race
and color, 334 U.S. at 34, has suffered the kind of injury that section 1982
was designed to prevent.' '50 Hurd v. Hodge cannot be cited as authority for
the position taken in Jones v. Mayer, however, because possible governmental
action has no bearing in the Jones decision.
It cannot be denied that there is overwhelming indication that courts
since the era of reconstruction have considered the Civil Rights Act in far
more limited terms than the present Supreme Court. Nevertheless, since there
was no definitive statement in either the Congress or in previous Supreme
Court decisions which have restricted the scope of this law, the Court can-
not now be castigated for exercising a power of interpretation which so
radically alters the well-established conceptions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.11
46 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
47ld. at 17.
48 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
49 Id. at 31.
50 Supra note 5.
51 "It is not unreasonable to conclude that the Congress that approved the fourteenth
amendment intended, in the first Civil Rights Act, to reach individual conduct as well
as state action." Robison, The Possibility of a Frontal Assault on the State Action Con-
cept, with Special Reference to the Right to Purchase Real Property Guaranteed, 41
NoTRE DAmz LAW. 455, 465 (1966).
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The Jones Court's interpretation of the 1866 Civil Rights Act has far-
reaching effect on the historical conception of property ownership. Whereas
both state and federal courts have always considered the owner to have
the prerogative over whom he will sell or rent to, Jones v. Mayer eradicates
the owner's opportunity to discriminate in the disposition of his property.
What is most surprising is that in the past there was little debate that a
private individual may discriminate. It was not only taken for granted, but
was unequivocably stated that in the absence of legislation to the contrary,
"[t]he individual citizen, whether he be black or white, may refuse to sell
or lease his property to anyone he might see fit."'52
To meet the challenge of the civil rights agitation in this country, a
number of states have passed "Fair Housing Laws" to allow Negroes to
move into neighborhoods that would otherwise have been closed to them
because of private discrimination." These laws have been upheld and en-
forced by their respective State courts. 54 Even though the worthwhile ob-
jectives of these bills are expressed in noble terms indicating an intent to
destroy the barriers erected against the Negro population,5 5 they all maintain
some form of restriction which permits a homeowner, or a landlord living
152 Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 F. 899, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1924). Typical judicial statements
supporting this proposition are: "[Elvery landlord undoubtedly has [the right] to make
his own selection of tenants . . . ." Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel, 46 Misc. 617, 92 N.Y.S.
851 (1905) ; "[Akn ordinary private landlord [has the privilege] to exclude Negroes from
consideration as tenants." Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d
541, 542 (1949); "[A] private landlord . . . is at liberty to select his tenants as he
pleases." Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 885, 279 P.2d 215,
216 (1955) ; "[Tlhe owner of the property ...had a perfect right to sell, or to refuse
to sell his property to anyone he might see fit." MacGregor v. Florida Real Estate
Comm., 99 So. 2d 709, 712 (1958); "[A]s a matter of fact and law, Progress has the
absolute right to select its own purchasers. It can select whites only, or Negroes only,
or whites and Negroes in any ratio it chooses." Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell,
182 F. Supp. 681, 695 (N.D. Ill. 1960). See McNeill, "Is there a Civil Right to Housing
Accommodations? 33 Noma DAe LAW. 463, 487 (1958).
53 See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-hff (1963); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
§ 35700ff (West 1967); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (H) (Page 1967).
54 Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313 (1962) ; Massa-
chusetts Comm. Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 344 Mass. 387, 182 N.E.2d 595
(1962); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 380 P.2d 34 (1962);
New Jersey Home Builder's Ass'n v. Division of Civil Rights, 81 N.J. Super. 243, 195
A.2d 318 (1963).
55 "The Law Against Discrimination is based on the express legislative finding that
discrimination is a threat to the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the State
and is a menace to free democracy." New Jersey Home Builder's Ass'n v. Division of
Civil Rights, 81 N.J. Super. 243, 249, 195 A.2d 318, 321 (1963). "We solemnly proclaim
that 'all men are created equal'; that 'all men have the inalienable right of acquiring, pos-
sessing, and protecting property.' We hold that as an unenumerated inalienable right a man
has the right to acquire one of the necessities of life, a home for himself and those depen-
dent upon him, unfettered by discrimination against him on account of his race, creed, or
color." Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Case, 380 P.2d 34, 41 (1962).
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in a small apartment building to discriminate. 56 The broad Civil Rights Bill
of 1968 has also maintained such restrictions.57 Undaunted, the Supreme
Court in 1968 has interpreted a 100 year old law in such a manner as to be
more progressive than the state or federal legislatures and to completely
overturn the oft-expressed judicial cofiception of property ownership.
Although the decision in Jones is almost revolutionary in its impact on
section 1982 and the concepts of ownership, the practical effect may be
slight indeed in the field of housing, as the Civil Rights Act of 1968 will
shortly become applicable to situations such as confronted Mr. Jones. As
the 1968 Act provides for recovery of punitive as well as actual damages, 58
a Negro who is rejected as a tenant or owner on account of his race or
color will undoubtedly prefer to bring suit under the terms of the new Civil
Rights Act, rather than under section 1982. As noted, though, the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 maintains certain limitations in its application,5 9 neces-
sitating use of section 1982 by those who would otherwise have no remedy.
It is possible to receive monetary damages by employing section 1982 in
conjunction with 28 U.S.C. section 1343 (4).60
An even greater handicap to achieving practical results under section 1982
is the difficulty of proving that the owner of a single-family dwelling or small
rooming house is discriminating solely on account of race or color. In the
situation of a larger housing complex, which ordinarily requires advertising
and real estate agents, it is not as difficult to prove that systematic exclusion
of Negroes who are capable of meeting the financial requirements is the
result of discrimination on account of race or color. In the situation involv-
ing dwellings with but a few units, advertising or agents are not usually
necessary, and the discriminating owner cannot be shown to demand any
requirements which the prospective Negro tenant or buyer has fulfilled.
Thus, without the owner blatantly expressing his bigoted reasoning, it is
unlikely a suit will be successful.
Given that the practical significance of the Jones decision does not have
far-reaching an effect in the field of housing as one might at first assume, the
sociological significance is of enormous proportions. Discrimination is finally
forbidden. When a Negro begins looking for a house or apartment, he knows
that he is legally entitled to live wherever he chooses. Of course he may run
5 6 See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. 18:25-12(g), (h) (1964); COL. Rv. STAT. ANw. 69-7-3(c)
(1963). Cal. Civ. Code, § 51, 52 (West Supp. 1968).
57 Civil Rights Bill of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, § 803 (2) (b).
58 Civil Rights Bill of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, § 812(c). "The court ...
may award to the plaintiff actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive dam-
ages . .. "
89 Civil Rights Bill of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, § 803(2) (b).
60Supra note 1.
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into a prejudiced individual and be barred from that home temporarily, or
possibly permanently if the discrimination cannot be proven. But that tem-
porary setback will not have as profound an influence on race relations in
this country as will the knowledge each Negro will have that the law is
actively on his side. The psychological boost the Negro will receive by
knowing that the powers of government, of the "establishment," are solidly
behind him, should help to regenerate a race downtrodden by a century of
discrimination. A sense of pride and dignity can be restored to a people
humbled by the fact that their choice of residence has been to a great
extent restricted by the whims of a white majority, who believed they were
supported by the law.
Possibly the effect will make itself felt on that white population which pre-
viously relished its opportunity to discriminate. Rather than feeling pride
in controlling property, they will realize that it is more important to feel
pride as a human being obeying the dictates of law and justice. The decision
in Jones has irrevocably destroyed the concept this nation has maintained
regarding an individual's power over his property, and in time this cannot
but have the effect of substantially reducing the amount of people who act
discriminatively in their property transactions.
It would be expected that the majority viewpoint would be well substan-
tiated. However, Justices Harlan's and White's analysis of the history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as well as the analysis conducted in this paper,
lead to the belief, "that the Court's thesis that the Act was meant to
extend to purely private action is open to the most serious doubt, if indeed
it does not render that thesis wholly untenable." 61 But difficult as it is to
justify the rationale of the decision, the exigencies of the situation require
such an outcome. Moreover, the principles upon which this country was
founded dictate that such a result should have occurred. Our founding
fathers in their Declaration of Independence held certain "truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness."'62 Certainly the Jones decision comports with
these noble aims. How then, can the Court be condemned for taking a
stand on so debatable a point, when it results in a great stride on the path
toward ridding this country of its ignoble discrimination.
Steven Adelman
61 Supra note 5, at 473.
62 The phrase "pursuit of happiness" is often believed to refer to property. This is
evidenced in the "Declaration of Rights" passed by the first Congress of the United
States, which declared, "That the inhabitants of the English colonies in North America
... have the following Rights: . . . That they are entitled to life, liberty, and prop-
erty .... " BECxER, Tnx DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1924 (1942).
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